

**Egypt Foreign Policy Orientation and Its Impacts On Civil-Military Relations in Egypt****Mohamed Elsheikh**

Department of Political Sciences and International Relations

Institute of Social Sciences

İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi

Tel: 00905396241729

Email: mahmedelsheikh@stu.aydin.edu.tr

Turkey

**Abstract**

*In civil-military relations, the focus is generally on the domestic variables. The article main hypothesis is that the foreign relations of Egypt have significant impact on the civil-military relations inside Egypt. The article reviewed the hypothesis by examining the foreign relations of Egypt during different periods which represents different political regimes adopting variant foreign policy orientations.*

*The study focuses on Egypt's relations with United States and Soviet Union and later Russia in international level. Also it focuses on Egypt's relations with Israel and Gulf countries especially Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in regional level.*

*The article concludes that the foreign countries interaction with Egypt can be addressed as a main factor that strongly shaped the relative balance of political powers between civilians and the military. The significance of the external factor on the civil-military relations was persistent despite the foreign policy orientations changed widely throughout historical advancement, and this prevented democratic transition.*

**Keywords: Army, Power, Coup****Introduction**

Egypt is one of the countries that witnessed revolutions of the Arab Spring. The years following the revolution showed problems in civil-military relations lasting from the establishment of the republic in July 1952, these events also showed the impacts of Egypt's relations with regional and international powers on the relationship between civilians and military.

The exogenous variables related to the foreign policy orientation of Egypt imposes great impact over the end shape of the civil-military relation inside the country. That is because the political structure and culture are not sufficiently developed, the foreign interventions are weakening it more and indeed may be one of its fundamental origins of this weakness.

Egypt foreign policy witnessed shifts from non-alignment to the east as USSR ally during the Nasser period and then dramatically changed and became a US ally from the Sadat period till nowadays. Except for the Morsi period, the armed forces succeeded to gain benefits from different situations in order to enhance the political cover of the existing regime and to obtain various forms of military, security and economic support. There are factors can hold significance in studying foreign policy interaction with civil-military relations in Egypt like military agreements with foreign states, Economic interests of both foreign states and the military, and Financial loans and aids. By studying these factors, the motives of foreign countries to intervene in domestic politics can be understood. Also, these factors can give a clear idea about the size of this intervention and its impact on the relations between civilian and military.

Samuel Huntington is one of the most influential theorists in civil-military relations field. His classic work 'the soldier and the state' is considered as the baseline of the contemporary civil-military theories, which dominated academia for several years. In his book, Huntington produces his assumption about what he called the 'military

mind'; and he assumes that the military mind can be described as the conservative realm. Building on that he demands the accepting and dealing with this mentality in order to obtain balanced civil-military relations within a given state (Huntington, 1957). Taking into considerations that his theory originated in the context of the cold war with the soviet union, and the ongoing internal debate in the United States about the balance of the military role in the foreign policy decision, and also that Huntington himself was known for his conservative perspective, some scholars like Bishara criticizes this theoretical perspective attributing its bias to the Huntington alignment with specific stand on deciding the military's foreign policy determinant role (Bisharah, 2017).

In addition to the impact of foreign policy on civil-military relations theories, many scholars have studied it from the practical level too. Noboru Yamaguchi and David A. Welch had studied this relation in their article 'Soldiers, civilians, and scholars'. They studied the civil-military relations from the bureaucratic politics perspective. In addition, they examined many ways by which the military can hold an effect on foreign policy orientation. The first building on Clausewitz, they saw the military force as a foreign policy tool, and its functions can be varied from offense, defense, deterrence, competence (convincing an adversary to do something by threatening force), intervention, signaling (showing support for an ally) and to occupation as well.

They mentioned four ways which military can affect the foreign policy of a state; it can be seen as levels of dominance in the decision-making process:

- A) *Military establishments and military interests which can set the political agenda.*
- B) *Military considerations which can constrain options.*
- C) *Bureaucratic interests of the military which can heighten political tensions.*
- D) *Military rivalries which can increase the inertia of political hostility (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005)*

During the 1950s and 1960s, some scholars argued that armed forces may have a positive role in politics. Shils (1962) and Vatikiotis (1961) viewed armies as agents of modernization in the newly independent states of the Middle East and they can lead the processes of industrialization, due to the organizational capacity. This reflected the embrace of modernization theories, which dominated academia in the 1950s and 1970s and considered industrialization as the key to the development of modern societies. But this argument did not focus much on the role of external aids or sanctions in modernization.

Pearlmutter (1969) used the term praetorian state, a state in which the military has the potential to dominate politics. In a praetorian state political leaders come mainly from the military, and the military plays a dominant role in all key political institutions (Pearlmutter, 1981). He viewed the military as a repressive force seeks to acquire more power and uses it to serve its own interests. He argued that once a military comes to political power, it was unlikely to handover of power to civilians. (Pearlmutter, 1969).

Nordlinger (1977) distinguished between military moderator, guardian and ruler regimes. In line with Pearlmutter, he argued that the actions of the military are affected by their interest, rather than by any other thing. (Nordlinger, 1977) and these interests have dual interaction with foreign countries orientations towards the state.

Another study by Roger W. Benjamin and Lewis J. Edinger attributed the level of military control over foreign policy determination process into the multiple numbers of variables, and they proposed a causal relationship model between those variables and the military control over foreign policymaking. The proposed variables are:

- A) *Decision-making framework: which examines the roles of the military in the decision-making process*
- B) *Normative role perception: this variable represents how the military perceives its role in the state.*
- C) *Political structures: studies how the political structure in a given state can afford more or less opportunity for military control*
- D) *Military resources and organization: sheds the light on the material an institutional advantage that the military may hold and adds momentum for military interventions in the foreign policy.*
- E) *Socioeconomic patterns: how the social composition and the economic conditions can give the military ground for more dominance in the foreign policy-making process.*

The study only concentrated on major states: United States, Germany, France, and Japan. They concluded that this multivariate relation could be a suggestive model for studying military role over foreign policy determination rather than univariate models (Benjamin & Edinger, 1971).

On both the theoretical and practical level of study of civil-military relations, the western studies cannot afford reliable frame for studying civil-military relations in Egypt as one of Middle East countries. The problem lies in the western bias towards the western contexts of shaping civil-military relations. For example, Huntington built his theory upon examining the army's history in western countries as Germany and France and the emergence of what he called the military professionalism. This is completely incompatible with the modern Egyptian army, which has been established under the British occupation of Egypt. Noboru Yamaguchi and David A studied the civil-military interactions in foreign policy determination by bureaucratic politics, while mostly in Egypt the military is more decisive on foreign policy as ex-military personnel in the presidency and government, mainly occupy the bureaucracy.

### **Impacts of Nasser foreign policy on the civil-military relations (1952-1970)**

The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was motivated by the desire to win Nasser as an ally regardless of the authoritarian nature of his regime. Therefore, Nasser started to get support from different states including the US, Soviet Union, and Britain through armament deals (Qureshi, 1982). Those deals strengthened the army and the military deterrent power against the civil opposition, as the gained power was used to deal with protests and contain the opposition. However, this strength was internally sufficient to contain the opposition, it was totally ineffective in facing the external threat as happened in 1967 war against Israel, where The Egyptian army was defeated and Sinai was occupied.

The US relation with the Nasser regime started early even before the July 1952 coup itself. CIA delegate to the Middle East Kermit Roosevelt held extensive meetings with the Egyptian officers (Bishara, 2017). One of the Muslim Brotherhood officer's mentioned meetings with the military attaché in US Embassy in Cairo between 1950 and 1952 where Nasser participated in, the hot topic in those meetings was the Egyptian army relations with the US, and the communist threat (Bishara, 2017). Another important member of the Free Officers Anwar Al-Sadat, who became later Nasser's successor, mentioned in his book 'My Life Story' that US ambassador in Cairo expressed his gratitude for informing him about the planned coup date (Bishara, 2017).

CIA delegate introduced a report to US secretary of state Dean Acheson before 'Free Officers' coup stressing that there is no fear from popular revolution by either Muslim Brotherhood or the communists. The report also stressed that the officers will be pragmatic and good negotiators when they come into power, and it is important to tolerate the coup and not to oppose it (Copeland, 1970).

The US supported Nasser regime technically, the US ambassador in Cairo ordered his agent Lain Prager to train Egyptian media on the propaganda and black media, those mechanisms were used to destroy Nasser enemies as Mohammed Naguib who demanded democratic rule (Copeland, 1970). The US helped Nasser to consolidate his power by enforcing him with required tools to exclude his political rivals including those who were calling for more democracy. It seems that the US officials did not have doubts that Nasser requested military aids will not be used, against Israel or even in Yemen; rather it was discussed regarding internal use with the domestic security issue.

It can be said that Nasser adapted the non-alignment as a declared strategy in the cold war, to take advantage of his position and gained support from both the US and USSR. However, in the end, he was completely dependent on USSR after 1967 war defeat against Israel.

As Nasser was in conflict with Israel, it was promoted that there is no chance for democratic demands. The Egyptian army was involved in the external war against the external enemy. That was used as justification for more dominance of the military in domestic politics, which in turn resulted in defected civil-military relations.

When Egypt was defeated in 1967 against Israel, there were popular protests against the light sentences after the military commander trial. Those protests were accompanied by demands for more democratic changes from

Nasser regime. When the military failed in facing the external enemy, the people started to raise their concerns about the delayed democracy or limitations of the freedom and the enlarged military positions (Bishara, 2017).

The defeat in war also was used by the military elites to initiate changes and get rid of their rivals inside the army. Abd Elhakeem Amer appointment as army General Commander was not because of his professional history but because he was trusted by Nasser, later when Nasser realized that Amer became more powerful than Nasser himself inside the military, Nasser used the events after the defeat in 1967 to get rid from Amer dominance in the army and regain his control over it (Brooks, 2015).

Nasser used the army as a foreign policy tool in wars. This can be noticed in the case of the war in Yemen; when Nasser sent the Egyptian troops to Yemen to support the Republican forces against the royalist (Dawisha, 1983), and of course this would not have been done in case of a real strong civilian position in the legislative branch or strong public opinion emerging from active civil society.

The flow of support from the Soviet Union to guarantee the influence, especially the military aids, opened the gate for the Egyptian military officers to benefit from it financially. The Soviet experts described the Egyptian officers, as they are involved in their business (Marfleet, 2011). This led to the strengthening of military status over civilians.

Nasser kept the army subordinate to him, and also the civilian opposition groups had no authority over the military issues and was derived from the right to discuss any matters related to the military allocation. Those measures are done to afford Nasser with the freedom to implement his policies that maybe not confined with the people interests.

## **Impacts of Sadat foreign policy on the civil-military relations (1970-1981)**

Anwar Al Sadat succeeded Nasser after his death. The sudden death of Nasser and succession by Nasser's deputy Sadat, led to crucial changes in Egypt both internally and externally. Sadat foreign policy witnessed complete divergence of orientation from East to West. While Nasser period ended with complete dependence on the Soviet Union militarily and economically, Sadat built a strong relationship with the United States. Sadat main thought was that; developing a closer relationship with the United States would press it to find a compromise for the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than total support to Israel.

Sadat was suffering from the difficulty to acquire offensive arms from the Soviet Union and in affording the spare parts for the Soviet arms that the Egyptian army already had (Qureshi, 1982). The military aids from the Soviet Union negatively affected the military as it created strong dependence on the Soviet Union, this dependence constrained Egypt's military orientation as it was being pressed to be confined with the Soviet orientations and avoiding conflicts with the US and its allies at that time.

Despite there are many factors that formed Sadat's decision to change his alliance from the Soviet Union to the US, but one of most essential reasons is the fact that most of Sadat's rivals politically and inside the military was relying on the Soviet Union as a supporter. So changing the map of alliance gave Sadat the chance to be superior in the relationships with the US and deprived his rivals of their traditional support source. The first months of Sadat carried bad news for the Soviets, Ali Sabri the head of Arab Socialist Union (ASU), that perceived as the Russian party, was ousted in a claimed coup attempt against Sadat (Copp, 1986). Also, Sadat got rid of Shaarawi Gomaa, the former interior ministry, and other power centers, through what Sadat called "corrective movement" in May 1971.

US relation with Sadat was mainly connected to the combat with Israel. During October 1973 war, Sadat informed US national security advisor Kissinger about his intention not to go further in the attack, the information which Sadat used to gain Kissinger trust led to military disaster (Bishara, 2017). The information should have reached Israelis and encouraged them to advance towards Cairo and regain balance in the battle (Bishara, 2017). Kissinger involved in mediation after the October 1973 war and proposed plan accepted by both the Egyptians and Israelis. During Camp David talks, Egyptians were negotiating at only one level that is Sadat, while the Israelis needed to negotiate through two levels by adding the domestic level including the Knesset and the electorates



(Brownlee, 2011). Sadat was non-accountable to the public opinion and felt free to impose his view and he depended on the state security forces to face any opposition. While Sadat only needed one hour to sign a peace treaty, Israeli Prime Minister, Begin, needed three days to finish his work. Moreover, the US president Jimmy Carter threatened Sadat that he would end his friendship if he did not accept the text needed for agreeing on a framework, Sadat was in the relatively weak stand during the negotiations and was regarded as flexible while his counterpart Begin was tougher and less intending to compromise (Brownlee, 2011).

Sadat almost reached the peace treaty solely with the only support of tight group inside the military and the government. So the treaty initiated wide domestic opposition and series of political changes inside Egypt. Thirteen MPs issued statement refusing the excluding the Palestinian issue from the deal and the limited sovereignty in Sinai and wasting of the military resources in Africa (Brownlee, 2011). People's Assembly dominated by Sadat accepted the agreement on 11 April 1979 with vast majority of 329 MPs and just thirteen rejected (Brownlee, 2011). While the opposition in People's assembly was minor in terms of number, Sadat decided to run a referendum on the peace treaty 19 April 1979, which gain 99.5 approval, and then Sadat called for new elections for the People assembly (Elmasry, 2011). Sadat wanted complete obedient assembly, as he could not handle even small opposition. Sadat was successful in the exclusion of Camp David opposing party Al Tagamu and only two opposing MPs were able to reach the assembly. The opposition in the assembly was handpicked opposition (Brownlee, 2011). After signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat started to receive gains from the treaty, 1 billion dollars as food aid and nearly equivalent to economic grants and loans. However, the economic aids did not manage to improve the economic crisis; it helped to strengthen the armed forces for the domestic role.

Sadat faced economic crisis, which also initiated strikes as 40,000 textile workers in Mahalla city in 1975, and the two days' bread uprising in 1976 following lifting subsidies decision by the government. Sadat accused the protestors as linked to the Soviet Union and required the army intervention that cost nearly 80 deaths. While the government faced 2-billion-dollar budget deficit, it imposed the subsidies lift rather than limiting military spending and without consulting the People Assembly (Brownlee, 2011).

It can be said that Sadat used the need of the United States and Israel for peace to gain support required to tighten his grip on the army, as well as to repress civil protests, and voices calling for democracy, and considering the opinion of the people representatives in any foreign agreements.

### **Impacts of Mubarak foreign policy on the civil-military relations (1982-2011)**

Civil-military relations during the Mubarak period witnessed highly stable trends following turbulent events at the beginning of his period. The sudden assassination of Sadat in 1981 brought his deputy Mubarak to the presidency. Mubarak was known as the pro-western figure, who was involved in multiple foreign affairs upon request of Sadat. Mubarak adopted policy centered on preserving the status quo both internally and externally. It was expected that Mubarak would not impose changes to foreign policy and he will commit with previous agreements especially the peace treaty with Israel.

Mubarak first years witnessed competition on the influence between Mubarak and his defense minister Abd El Haleem Abu Ghazala. The foreign relations orientations represented an important variable in the competition between the two men. The US the main ally of Egypt favored Abu Ghazala during the certain time over Mubarak himself, and Abu Ghazala received more privileged treatment in the US as defense minister, while Mubarak the president hadn't received like this treatment (Springborg, 1987). This was because of the US desire to exploit the competition between the presidency and the military head in the Egyptian state in order to force Mubarak to follow its interests, especially in the economic aspect. The US investment in the relationship with the military corporation rather than any other civilian power in Egypt deepens the pattern of military dominance and increased military role in politics. Even Mubarak could not expel Abu Ghazala from his office. Mubarak managed later to dismiss Abu Ghazala in 1989 when he was accused to develop hidden missile program in cooperation with Iraq and Argentina (CIA, 1999) and attempting to smuggle materials from the US illegally (Bishara, 2017).

This manner precipitates the military involvement in the political issues, and its negative impact is represented in magnifying the power of military over the civil leadership in the state which negatively affected the

norm of civilian superiority over the military entity. Furthermore, it creates a situation where the different political figures whether civilians or military ones inside the country start to seek the satisfaction of the foreign state interests to reach more political power, and the satisfaction of the foreign state interests could be on the expense of the state and people interests.

The American investment in the Egyptian army and Mubarak proved to be beneficial during the first Gulf war in 1991. When the US formed a coalition to free Kuwait which Iraq's Saddam invaded. Egypt was the 4th largest contributor to the US coalition by 35,000 more solid (Al-Weshah, 2016). Egypt gained appraisal from the Arab countries and the US, it has been rewarded by sweeping debts worth 20 billion dollars from the Arab Gulf States, Europe, and the US (Al-Weshah, 2016).

Another pattern of civil-military relations during the Mubarak period which was built on Sadat orientation is the usage of the military capabilities for the interests of the foreign allies. Not only Egypt participated in the first Gulf war for the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion, but also the military cooperation with foreign powers reached high levels. This cooperation exceeded the normal fields to extreme ones like the Egyptian participation of secret detentions and investigations under the name of 'war on terror' for the US government (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

The previous trends are linked directly to the most crucial variable in the equation of the foreign relation of Egypt during the Mubarak period that is the military aid. The US military aid not only fostered the above-mentioned patterns in the civil-military relations but also imposed other critical impacts on the military internally. The economic benefits aroused from the weapon deals linked to US military aid represented one of the major economic activities of the military (Nassif, 2013). In addition, as the Egyptian military got the US military aid it developed its ability to deal with the opposition inside the state and enforced the military control over the politics.

The US support to the Egyptian military was always concerned as it is devoted mainly to strengthening the regime's domestic security and its ability to confront popular movements, rather than strengthening Egypt's national defenses (Axelrod, 2011). It has been demanded by Egyptian opposition figures like Amr Hamzawi and Saad El-Din Ibrahim and even American intellectuals as the journalist John Bradley, that part of the US assistance should be directed to NGOs promoting democracy, or linking the continuity of assistance with the progress in political reforms (Axelrod, 2011). Those voices did not find its way to US policy towards the Mubarak regime as the US continued its pragmatic approach in supporting Mubarak with regard to the authoritarian nature of his regime.

Despite the raised voices calling to enforce more democratization in the Middle East and as proposed in Condoleezza Rice Middle East Partnership Initiative, Mubarak remained practically unaffected with the limited vocal critics to his authoritarian regime (Al-Weshah, 2016). When Congress in 2008 proposed an act to suspend 200 million dollars' aids to Egypt to force Mubarak to conduct judiciary reforms and decrease the security hands over the society, Condoleezza Rice opposed the act that would threaten US strategic partnership with Mubarak regime (Aran and Ginat, 2014).

The peace treaty and the increased normalization with Israel and the global interest in 'war on terror' from also both US and Russia; paved the way for Egypt military and security forces to implement hard measures, not only against aggressive Islamists but also included moderate non-aggressive political Islamist movement like the Muslim Brotherhood. These measures caused paralysis in the political life and hindered any steps towards democracy.

The tight security measures against Islamist in politics was only eased when the US demanded that during George Bush Jr. administration. The US interventions were present till the last days of Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution in 2011; when US demanded his stepping down from power by the US president Obama and then the US appraised the transfer of the power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) during the transitional period. It may be justified that the bilateral military relations assured that Egypt's military will not adopt any actions that may threaten US interests.

### **Impacts of Egypt foreign policy during the Arab Spring on the civil-military relations (2011-2013)**

The period followed 25 January 2011 revolution represented a crucial time in Egyptian politics. The civil-military relations came to the surface and affected Egypt fate. The importance of this period is directly related to the

position of the Egyptian military as the controller of power, from the ousting of Mubarak until the election of president Morsi, and continued as the military remained an active political actor, which was replaced with the military coup in July 2013.

When the revolution started, the Obama administration found itself in front of hard choices. Regarding the declared American values like freedom and democracy, the US was obligated to show its support to the popular moves. On the other hand, losing an important figure as Mubarak who was the most important ally in the region caused a source of unrest, especially when the possible substitution options produced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

By the act P.L 112-74, US Congress approved Obama administration plans for supporting Egypt economically, but this support was on two conditions. It required Egypt commits to the peace treaty with Israel, and on the other hand, that Egypt takes more steps towards democracy through fair elections (Sharp, 2012). The act also stated that the Secretary of State has the right to waive this requirement and approves the delivering of funds to the Egyptian state (Sharp, 2012). Some US administration officials argued that if it was decided to hold the funds dedicated for the Egyptian military, that is going to result in the inability of the Egyptian army to pay its contracts as the military aid is dedicated exclusively to buy from American companies (Sharp, 2012). In the end, the US administration decided to waive the prerequisites and deliver the funds to Egypt. It shows that security is weighing more than democratic values when it comes to relations with Egypt.

The US aids were normally intended to use Egypt army in the security goals of the US, also cultural aids were used to encourage the normalization with Israel. On the other hand, there was no adequate allocation of aids to improve the democratization, human rights or civil society presence.

When US was in crisis with SCAF as result of the NGOs case in late 2011, US managed to get their citizen back from Egypt but could not reopen the NGOs again despite it threatened with cutting the military aid (Sharp, 2012). US came to point where it probably sought that going further in conflict with SCAF would harm its interests while scarifying the work of NGO on the democracy and free election would have a minimal drawback.

Despite Obama administration publicly asserted its support for the power transition to civilians, it maintained what was described as 'two-stop shopping', as US officials maintained the pattern of visiting Morsi and MB from one side and the military from the other side (Aftandilian, 2013).

The reason that US maintained balanced relations with the military and Morsi may be attributed to two main factors: first, the Egyptian military is important for US foreign policy in the region and especially for the security of Israel. Secondly, MB may have to confront agendas with US foreign policy, especially the hostility towards Israel, despite Morsi declared he is going to stick to a peace treaty with Israel. On August 2012 when 16 soldiers were killed on the borders with Israel. Morsi appointed younger officers like El Sisi as defense minister. El Sisi was the head of military intelligence and the youngest members of SCAF.

When Chuck Hagel succeeded Panetta as US defense secretary, El Sisi started to strengthen his relationship with him (Hessler, 2017). Hagel visited Egypt in March 2013 and described the relations with El Sisi as he said "Our chemistry was very good," (Hessler, 2017). When the predefined date for protests against Morsi on 30th of June get closed, El Sisi intensified his communications with Hagel reaching about fifty calls, at least once a week (Hessler, 2017). Hagel said that sometimes the call lasted more than one hour, and Hagel became the only US official who is talking to El Sisi (Hessler, 2017). El Sisi in a late phone call just before the coup said: 'What can I do?' Hagel remembered. 'I mean; I can't walk away. I can't fail my country. I have to lead; I have support. I am the one person in Egypt today that can save this country.' (Hessler, 2017). It is very interesting how two top military commanders were discussing political issues in their countries and more specifically the intention of intervention from El Sisi side. There is no evidence that Hagel opposed El Sisi from taking the coup actions, at least it can be expected that El Sisi wanted to pass the message to US administration in order to test its level of opposition to the action.

Russia did not support the Arab Spring movement in Egypt even when Morsi reached the presidency, that stance could have undermined the international support for the Morsi regime who was in a confrontation with the



military. Russia stand was mainly because it perceived Arab Spring with suspicion, described it as manipulated and feared that it could spread to other ally states resulting in minimizing the Russian influence. As Russia was actively supporting the Assad regime in Syria in the face of the Syrian revolution, the approaching between Russia and Arab Spring regimes like the Morsi regime became more difficult. Morsi stands from supporting the revolutionaries in Syria was clear and this hardened the cooperation, taking into consideration that Russia is classifying MB that Morsi belongs to a terror group in Russia. All these led to the lack of Russian support for the newly born regime, which was facing challenges in its relations with the United States and Israel, therefore with the popular uprising, all these countries accepted the army's move to regain the power.

It is obvious that Israel preferred Mubarak authoritarian regime that commits to Israel security over a more democratic regime that carries ambiguity and maybe insecurity to Israel. Israel viewed the MB, the main opposition group, as an anti-West, anti-liberal, anti-Israel and an anti-democratic.

The Israeli official got promises from the SCAF regime that the cooperation for the security of Israel will be continued. The civilian groups in Egypt showed hostility towards Israel especially during the Israeli embassy crisis in 2011, besides Morsi supportive stand to Hamas during its war against Israel in 2012.

When Morsi was elected as president, the fears that Netanyahu expressed from the reach of Islamists to the power became truth. When Israel executed air strikes over Gaza in May 2012, the committee of Arab affairs in parliament demanded the government to withdraw Egypt ambassador in Tel Aviv (Agdemir, 2016). The demands became fact when Israel started a military campaign over Gaza in October 2012; Morsi withdrew his ambassador from Israel and Egypt played the main role in implementing ceasefire between the two sides (Agdemir, 2016).

The Arab spring constituted a survival threat for most of the Gulf States. As the Arab spring was mainly concentrated around popular demands for more democratic regimes, the Gulf region is composed of authoritarian traditional monarchies which depend on the revenues from oil and natural gas as economic and political stabilization factor. Gulf monarchies feared that their own people could be infected by the freedom voices raising in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Saudi Arabia viewed the Arab Spring suspiciously, as it feared that Iran would take advantage of the regime changes to increase its influence in the region. Perhaps the Shiite uprising in Bahrain against the Sunni monarchy in February 2011 irritated Saudis.

The Gulf States and Saudi Arabia especially is important for the Egyptian economy, Egypt is ranked as the 2nd most receiver of the Gulf economic aids after Morocco (Isaac, 2014). The Gulf States made use of the economic crisis followed 2011 uprising in Egypt as a tool to get leverage over the Egyptians.

There are studies that also talk about the Gulf non-official aids to the political actors, websites, TVs and elections campaigns (Isaac, 2014). It is believed that Saudi Arabia mainly invested in Al Nour party that holds Salafist ideology, while Qatar mostly backed MB and its members.

The Emirati conflict with Morsi rule is also induced by regional factors. The fear of the improvement in Egyptian-Iranian relations irritated Emiratis. Morsi visit to Tehran in August 2012 and the visit of Iranian foreign affairs minister to Cairo in January 2013 represented signs of the improved relations.

Despite most of Gulf monarchies promised large amounts of aids to Egypt after 25 January revolution, an only small percentage of these aids was delivered and mainly in the time of SCAF rule, with the exception of Qatar which delivered more aids during Morsi rule. UAE started political harassment with Morsi regime by an arresting group of Egyptians accusing them of ties with MB and by hosting Shafik who was Morsi competitor and was accused of corruption charges and conspiring against Morsi.

The fatal role of the UAE and Saudi Arabia is described in the New Yorker report which quotes senior American diplomat (Filkins, 2018). In his words, he clarifies the plotting of Mohamed bin Zayed who is the deputy supreme commander of UAE and Bander Bin Sultan, the Saudi intelligence head (Filkins, 2018). The American senior stated that they supported Tamarud movement that formed the civil front of the opposition against Morsi, and at the same time, they encouraged El Sisi to ouster Morsi by offering 20 billion US dollars (Filkins, 2018).



### **Impacts of Egypt foreign policy after the July 2013 coupon the civil-military relations**

The foreign states stand from the military coup have a great impact on the civil-military relations in Egypt. It is expected that the coup action would be rejected totally from the foreign countries especially those embraces democratic values as the coup represents the extreme level of the military intervention in politics. Even the democratic states reaction towards the coup was only vocal critics which represented the condemning of use of violence.

Taking into consideration that labeling the military action in Egypt as a coup would obligate the US to cut its aid to Egypt according to the law that prohibits supporting coup regimes. The US did not label the action as a coup to preserve its shared interests with the Egyptian army. The political support of the U.S. was also represented in the Congress stand, which appraised the ousting of Morsi and MB from power. U.S. officials like Secretary of State John Kerry stated that military in Egypt would handle the power to civilians (Menshawy, 2014).

Obama administration gave legitimacy for El Sisi as president, Obama himself congratulated the coup leader El Sisi after winning the presidency (whitehouse.gov, 2014), despite the election was made in unusual political circumstances that included the exclusion of opposition groups. This shows that the US was looking for any minor transformation to repair its relations with Egypt to maintain US common interests.

Not only political support. But furthermore, the U.S. developed strong relations with El Sisi regime especially on the level of military cooperation, this cooperation included excessive continuous meetings between the military officials in the two states, armament deals from the U.S. and the participation in military practices.

Russia stands from 2013 military coup was supportive from the early days, Russia relations with the coup regime was multidimensional and showed great breakthrough in comparison with the cold relations during the SCAF or Morsi periods. The political relations included top-level presidential meetings, the military relations included armament deals and joint military practices, and economic relations included increasing the Russian investments in Egypt and in particular in strategic areas like the industrial zone in the new Suez Canal project (Sputnik Arabic, 2017), and Al Dabaa Nuclear station (Almasry, 2018).

It can be said that El Sisi who was looking for international legitimacy and Putin who was looking for increase the Russian influence in the Middle East, both found shared interests in cooperation with each other.

The Jewish lobby in the U.S. played a substantial role in supporting El Sisi regime. The Jewish lobby interests are represented in preserving Israel security. The Jewish Lobby groups preferred the Egyptian military to be in power as Egypt army had a history of commitment with Israel security since the peace treaty. Morsi's position towards supporting Hamas against Israel in 2012 war may have irritated the Jewish lobby and gave a sign that Morsi's regime would not be in favor of Israel.

Security relations between Egypt and Israel have developed since the military coup in July 2013. There were Israeli security concerns about the events associated with 25 January 2011 revolution and Muslim Brotherhood control of power in Egypt, but these fears quickly disappeared with the military coup.

An Israeli security delegation visited Cairo in August 2013 after the coup, to ensure the continuation of security cooperation between the two sides. Israeli newspaper Jerusalem post considered that the military cooperation between Israel and Egypt reached unprecedented levels after EL Sisi came to power (Groos, 2017), but it seems that they try to reduce the level of media attention because it embarrasses El Sisi and gives his opponents propaganda material against him.

The former Israeli defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, called for strengthening cooperation between Israel and Egypt and supporting El Sisi in the war on terror in Sinai. He stressed that intelligence cooperation between Israel and Egypt on everything happening in Sinai is an Israeli interest (Aljazeera.net, 2016b).

The bilateral relations reached a state of military harmony to conduct the first joint military exercises between the two countries, and explicit Israeli media statements about the possibility of providing any security or military support to the Egyptian government. In the wake of the deadliest terror attack ever on Egyptian soil, that

resulted in killing over 300 people inside a mosque in the northern Sinai in November 2017, Israel was ready to respond to any Egyptian request to increase military and security cooperation in the Sinai (Ahronheim, 2019).

The Saudi support to 3 July 2013 coup regime started once Morsi has been ousted, the coup regime received financial support from Saudi Arabia in terms of funds and also commodities like petrol, there was a remarkable increase in Saudi investment in the Egyptian market. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia financed the Egyptian military by participating in funding armament deals.

Following the coup, the Saudi King Abdullah announced the providing of an aid package to help the Egyptians face the economic challenges, with total 5 billion USD, divided into 1 billion USD as a cash grant and 2 billion USD as commodities, 2 billion USD as a deposit with the Central Bank without funding costs. Egypt has already received a total package (Hasaneen, 2019). After Egypt faced a major energy crisis, which negatively affected its electricity production, Saudi Arabia raised its oil assistance to Egypt from 2 billion USD to 5 billion USD (Youssef, 2016).

Saudi Arabia also provided in-kind assistance represented in 1000 metric tons of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to minimize the energy crisis in Egypt. In November 2014, three new bilateral agreements with a total of 350 million USD were signed to finance two power plants to solve the electricity crisis, which has worsened over the previous years (Youssef, 2016).

At the end of 2015, King Abdullah ordered the provision of economic aid to Egypt, satisfying its oil needs over the next five years, increasing Saudi investments in Egypt to more than 30 billion riyals, encouraging Saudi ships to support transport movement through Suez Canal (Reuters, 2016).

Arms deals between Egypt and Russia, estimated at billions of dollars Funded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, considered an indication of the close rapprochement between the Egyptian side and the Saudi side on the one hand, and the Egyptian side and the UAE side on the other after the coup of 3 July 2013 (Gamal, 2016). The French Newspaper Le Figaro reported that Saudi Arabia funded the larger part for the deal of buying Mistral (an amphibious assault ship), which cost up to 950 million €. In February 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported the purchase of French military equipment by Egypt, including Rafal fighters (Fouad, 2016).

It can be stated that there was unprecedented Saudi support to Egypt which reflects the political desire to back the coup regime. The support can be linked to the fact that both the uprising in Egypt in 2011 and the increased political power of Morsi and MB have been perceived as a threat for the Saudi Arabia as one of Gulf monarchies.

The military cooperation represented in financing armament deals and joint practices reveals the importance of the security role of Egypt to the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia has always been concerned about the Iranian threat as a regional rival, the support of the Egyptian military can be attributed to the Saudi policy to assure that Egyptian military will be present when needed as in the Gulf war. Generally, the Saudi regime played a crucial role in strengthening the coup regime against the civilian's factions to assure its interests in Egypt which was reflected negatively on the civil-military relations.

Since 2013, the UAE has officially and unofficially provided the Egyptian regime with around 25 billion USD in grants, loans and bank deposits to pay for the stability of the El Sisi regime (mubasher.aljazeera.net, 2016), some of which were announced as follows: July 2013, UAE grants Egypt 1 billion USD and 2 billion USD interest-free loans (Alittihad.ae, 2013) October 2013, the UAE gave Egypt 3.9 billion USD in aid, including about 1 billion USD dedicated for fuel and energy (Russia Today Arabic, 2013). April 2017, UAE grants Egypt 4 billion USD (radiosawa.com, 2016). This grant was divided into two parts, the first in the form of investments, and the second part to be paid in the form of a deposit to the Central Bank of Egypt to support the cash reserve. What has been officially announced by the government in the two countries about 12 billion USD, and the rest have not been officially disclosed, but unveiled by experts in the economy, as well as some leaks published in the Arab and foreign Media.

It is noticed that after the coup of 3 July 2013, the UAE adopted grants, loans and direct aid to the Egyptian regime. But two years later, Abu Dhabi sought to control the Egyptian economy through a number of institutions

and companies, to minimize the cost of support and to benefit from the large facilities provided by El Sisi to the UAE.

The Emirati investments concentrated in infrastructure areas as the telecommunication, transportation health, and energy. The Emirati investments in those fields acquiring a large share of the market. It seems that Emirates is seeking to get more influential tools in Egypt that could be used as a pressing mean to get the Egyptian regime to achieve its interests. The challenge that would face any civil regime that succeeds El Sisi is dealing with the greatly enlarged Emirati influence inside the Egyptian economy including vital sectors that could directly affect the national security of Egypt.

### Conclusion

Egypt foreign policy witnessed shifts from non-alignment to the east as USSR ally during the Nasser period and then dramatically changed and became a US ally during the Sadat period which lasted until nowadays. Foreign relations of Egypt have a significant impact on the civil-military relations inside Egypt. These impacts were usually in favor of the military. The regional and international powers, competing for influence within Egypt, realized that the army is the solid power of the political system. The armed forces took advantage of this situation to gain benefits from different countries in order to enhance the political cover of the existing regime and to obtain various forms of military, security and economic support.

The significance of the external factor on the civil-military relations was persistent despite the foreign policy orientations changed widely throughout historical advancement. Yet the patterns and trends of the emergent impacts have been widely changed regarding the nature of the Egyptian regime itself and the international context.

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Istanbul Aydin University gave me the chance to present this study, which I hope to be useful for researchers interested in Egyptian affairs, as the changes taking place in Egypt have a direct and significant impact on all-region.

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