

Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle: A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Model for Combatting New Terrorism

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Abstract:

Terrorism in the new millennium has morphed drastically since the 1970s. The terrorist organizations of today are a hybrid between the insurgent group models of the 1960s and modern terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. This hybrid model has created what has become a transnational insurgency recruited, trained, and led by major terrorist networks such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Even smaller regional groups such as Boko Haram have surpassed merely conducting terrorist attacks. These smaller groups are also focused on controlling territory. Tan (2008) refers to this change as “New Terrorism”. To combat New Terrorism, a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and counterterrorism tactics must be employed. This study will examine the need to define roles and responsibilities for various organization and various echelons through the introduction of a new Special Operations Forces model; Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle. The acronym to be used for this model is D³. This model recommends different tactics, techniques, and procedures for forces not specifically assigned the counterterrorism mission. As new terrorism continues to change, only counterterrorism forces should be tasked with the Find Fix Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) model of targeting (Counterterrorism 2014). All other military and law enforcement elements should disrupt and deny the enemy in support of the counterterrorism effort. This study is based on extensive research and the author’s 23 years of experience serving in U.S. Army Special Forces. Throughout his career, the author interacted with people from various social, economic, and professional backgrounds throughout the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans.

Keywords: Counterterrorism, Terrorism, New Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, and Asymmetric Warfare

Introduction:

Due to the rapidly changing dynamics of various terrorist organizations and the growing instability of developing nations, the need for Special Operations Forces (SOF) has probably never been greater. While various scholars disagree on whether terrorist networks can be or should be defined as insurgencies, the dire need to combat these organizations cannot become mired in terminology. The enemy has adapted, through the use of global communications and social media, into elements that combine aspects of both terrorist and insurgent operational and strategic tactics. Tan (2008) describes this new hybrid concept of terrorism as “New Terrorism”. Whether defined as terrorist networks, insurgencies, or New Terrorism, the enemy’s shift in tactics mandates that the Special Operations community must combine counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics in order to adapt to New Terrorism and defeat it.

New Terrorism must be constantly pressured at all levels of the terrorist network. Combating such a fluid enemy will require a holistic approach, which greatly increases the need for coordination and training with local and provincial law enforcement entities. While currently robust, an even greater emphasis on intelligence and the ability to operationalize collected intelligence, at all levels, must be improved.


Essentially, the intelligence community must increase dissemination in order to maximize the return on investment in much the same way that the National Football League (NFL) maximizes profits.

This analogy refers to the manner in which the NFL not only profits from corporate advertising and ticket sales, but also advances a robust merchandising effort down to the team level (Brunkhorst and Fenn, 2010). To garner the same effect, intelligence liaisons must be closely tied to Special Operations Advisors to maximize the ability to operationalize intelligence and advise partner forces. This allows the Special Operations Advisor the ability to increase the speed in which partner forces can conduct operations that capitalize on collected intelligence, while simultaneously increasing the effect on the enemy. In essence, every ounce of intelligence must be wrung from every operation at every level in much the same manner as every dollar is wrung from an NFL football game.

Disrupt, Deny, And Dismantle:

The operational cycle of counterterrorism forces must be exponentially increased in order to decrease the enemy's ability to regenerate leaders and resources. Therefore, a three-dimensional model dubbed Disrupt, Deny, and Dismantle (D^3) is recommended. This approach, based on research and the author's experience, focuses on the premise of a holistically coordinated effort. The bulk of this holistic effort should be conducted by, with, and through host nation forces. The Disrupt, Deny, and Dismantle model allows the host nation forces at various levels to be employed within their cultural and operational capabilities, while maximizing Special Operations intelligence and operational capabilities.

The operating environment of New Terrorism cannot be viewed as a two-dimensional battlefield. The operating environment must be viewed as a three dimensional cube. The D^3 model pressures the enemy from all sides of the three dimensional cube. The D^3 model creates a virtual box around the terrorist network's operational environment. The continuous pressure exerted by the virtual box confines the enemy while allowing the partner forces, which form the bulk of the virtual box, to immediately react to any move the terrorist network makes. The virtual box will pressure the network's decision cycle. This will create opportunities to kill and or capture senior terrorist leaders. As the knowledge of the terrorist network is expanded, disseminated, and operationalized, the virtual box around the terrorist network continually contracts. This ultimately denies the terrorist network and its leaders the freedom to maneuver or communicate, which will ultimately render the terrorist organization combat ineffective.



Counterterrorism Leadership:

Due to the sophisticated terrorist networks operating globally, U.S. Special Operations counterterrorism forces should lead the global effort. However, other Special Operations Forces can greatly enhance the effort of counterterrorism forces through a broader collaborative approach. This broader approach incorporates many aspects of counterinsurgency, while effectively and efficiently using partner forces as a force multiplier at all levels, within their capabilities. Employing the partner forces within their capability will increase confidence within the ranks and among the local populace. Incorporating local and provincial law enforcement agencies as well as local paramilitary units is the only way to instill a sense of ownership in the broader fight. Because the members of these local units are from the local area, their presence will inspire a sense of ownership among the local populace.

Concept of the Model:

The foundation of the model will be described throughout this document. However, the basic premise is to collectively and simultaneously capitalize on three distinct and vital functions.

1. It enables host nation local and regional police and paramilitary forces to disrupt freedom of movement and facilitation.
2. It capitalizes on host nation conventional forces to conduct area denial within their capacity and capability.
3. Most importantly, D^3 allows national level U.S. and host nation counterterrorism units to focus on dismantling the terrorist network's senior leadership.

This model is scalable based on threat levels and partner force capacity and or capability. The D^3 model is extremely efficient and effective due to its utility, scalability and fluidity. This holistic efficiency and effectiveness greatly enhances the ability to gain faster access to the enemy's decision cycle. The result of faster access to the decision cycle is the advanced speed in which senior terrorist leaders can be killed or captured. The key aspect of this model is to collect and disseminate law enforcement intelligence and national level intelligence more efficiently and effectively across the battlefield through operational advisors. This greatly increases the ability to operationalize the intelligence, which greatly increases the ability to pressure the enemy holistically and continuously at all levels. Increased speed and agility is imperative to the destruction of New Terrorism.

A Scalable Model:

This model can be effectively applied, in varying degrees, across the spectrum of security and stability. This model can be modified, scaled and implemented in ungoverned territories, such as those that exist in Somalia, Libya, and other African nations, to countries with large swaths of denied areas, such as Syria and Iraq. It can be up-scaled significantly to support fragile states such as Egypt and Nigeria. The same model can be used to remain "Left of the bang" (A term used to describe the security posture prior to a spike in terrorism) in relatively more stable states such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Ghana, and Brazil.

Because of the transnational growth of what is often referred to as “New Terrorism”, the current doctrinal approach regarding the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) process, will not be as effective as it was in previous years (Counterterrorism 2014). This is largely because host nation forces, with varying skill levels and resources, are not as capable of executing the F3EAD process effectively. While the F3EAD process is still an extremely effective model for national level counterterrorism units across the globe, most host nation units cannot replicate this capability for various reasons. These reasons will be discussed throughout this document. A graphic representation of the model is depicted.



The Model’s Holistic Premise:

The basis of the D³ model is the ability to divide roles and responsibilities, concerning the fight against New Terrorism, among the various elements within the United States Army Special Operations Command and host nation forces. This creates the ability to scale the level of effort and authorities with the level of intensity of the enemy. This are critical to the destruction of terrorist networks. For example, the need to assist in the disrupt phase of active terrorist cells, in a relatively stable nation, may simply require a few advisors. Conversely, a combat FID mission may require full scale training and advisory support to assist partner forces. While there are often legal issues associated with the use of police elements, the local law enforcement is a critical component to pressuring the network.

Legal Authorities:

According to Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency, 2006), “Assistance to Police by U.S. forces is permitted but not with the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead government agency” (p. D-1). The lead agency for all police and law enforcement training is the Department of State (DoS). However, Special Operations Forces can provide advanced force protection training that enables police units to maintain a presence in high threat districts. Special Operations Forces can also train and or assist with the establishment of paramilitary units with law enforcement authorities (Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations, 2007). The lead department within the DoS is the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (Counterinsurgency, 2006). This relationship works well because Special Operations Forces do not have the skill set to train police on the rule of law, establishing probable cause, and other specific criminal justice matters.

In stabilized countries, law enforcement and paramilitary training can be conducted as a Joint Combined Exchange Training event. In other cases Title 22 Non-combatant authorities may be used to provide support in an advisory role only. This still allows for the dissemination of law enforcement intelligence and assistance in planning law enforcement operations. According to Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (2010) “Military Counterintelligence (CI) personnel have the authority to share intelligence, authorized for release, with host nation intelligence, security, and police elements operating within the CI member’s area of operation” (p. VI-38). This allows counterintelligence personnel to conduct overt intelligence sharing without hindering national level human intelligence collection efforts.

The D³ concept is intended to provide a recommended model to be used within the framework of current U.S. policy and military authorizations rather than discuss the possibilities of future policy changes and authorities. The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations (2007) states “United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission” (p. 4-1). This allows for a modular, scalable template that can be used to assist nations experiencing the initial onset of terrorist networks as well as combat FID for nations overwhelmed by terrorist organizations. This scalable model can be employed in various scenarios ranging from Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) to complex Combat FID operations.

From Disruption to Dismantle:

While certain local units disrupt facilitation networks, national level counterterrorism forces can capitalize on the intelligence, gathered through the host nation force’s disruption efforts. This intelligence can then be used to capture or kill senior terrorist leaders. A disruption operation could be as simple as a “knock and talk” conducted by local law enforcement officials in order to stimulate activity among local facilitators. This simple step, when properly coordinated can then provide opportunities for national level collection efforts. By creating a holistic approach with cascading and scalable partner force involvement, pressure is constantly exerted on the enemy from all sides of the virtual box described previously.

This approach not only provides a framework for current counterterrorist operations, but provides the cascading framework for the capacity building and training of forces throughout Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). This allows commanders to build partner forces in areas that are not yet embroiled in terrorist attacks and develop a capability prior to a spike in terrorism, or “Left of the bang” as it is often described. In many cases, the D³ model will initiate the formation or transformation of military and paramilitary organizations best suited for the roles of disruption and area denial.

Local Facilitation:

Every terrorist act requires local facilitation in the area of the attack. Therefore, local facilitators are critical to the success of any transnational terrorist organization. To defeat the network, there must be an ability to constantly pressure the local facilitation networks. Local and provincial police units are best suited for the role of pressuring local networks because they are the most capable force for establishing a human intelligence framework within their area of operation (Counterinsurgency, 2006). Advisors can assist in dissemination of the local intelligence to the national level forces. By creating a constant flow of intelligence at all levels, numerous partner forces are then able to conduct small and large scale operations, along various operational lines of the terrorist network, continuously and near simultaneously.

New Terrorism:

Global transnational terrorism is growing at an alarming rate. The ability of various terrorist organizations to recruit members through social media and the internet has increased the membership of these organizations. The internet and social media also enable various terrorist groups and criminal factions to communicate and collaborate when mutually beneficial. Andrew Tan (2008) defines New Terrorism as:

Motivation by apocalyptic, millenarian religion that espouses violence; mass-casualty terrorist attacks which could potentially involve the use of weapons of mass destruction; a transnational mode of operation that disregards national borders; a global presence, made possible by decentralized, networked organizational structures and local strategic alliances; the multinational character and composition of its members; decreasing dependence on state sponsors as the ability to operate across borders has increased; and the exploitation and use of modern technology and communications to reach out to potentially millions of supporters as compared to the much smaller clandestine support base in the pre-Internet age (p. 313).

Whether the reader fully agrees with this definition or not, many facets of this definition reflect the dynamics of most terrorist organizations today. Many policy makers in the west tend to view the term transnational to refer only to terrorist organizations that can attack Europe and North America, such as Al Qaeda. However, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and other terrorist organizations have conducted attacks outside of their respective base countries of operation (Tan, 2008). Gearon (2013) further explains that in Mali and other African nations the line is often blurred between criminal enterprises and terrorist organization. Often, the same group conducts violent acts for criminal and terrorist purposes.

Insurgency:

While Morris (2005) posits that Al Qaeda is an insurgency, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 (2006), Counterinsurgency, defines insurgency as:

An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (p. 1-1).

Cultural Obstacles:

Phillip Carl Salzman, Professor of Anthropology at McGill University, posits the Middle Eastern and North African sense of tribal loyalty stems from centuries of a proud Bedouin heritage in which various Bedouin tribes conquered nations from India to Morocco (Salzman, 2011). One of the major hurdles to holistically defeating terrorism and other forms of insurgency in the Middle East is due to the inherent distrust of the

Central Government and Central Government forces (Salzman, 2011). Salzman (2011) supports this position with the statement “There are three tenets of Middle Eastern social relations. These are: only trust your kin, always side with closer against more distant, and never trust the state” (para 5). While tribal influence in developed nations may not be as strong as it is in underdeveloped nations, tribal loyalty remains a factor in the cultural fabric of the Middle East and Africa.

Distrust of Central Governments:

While the local tribes do not generally support terrorist organizations, the lack of trust for the central government dissuades the tribes from providing valuable information or other forms of support. The tribal culture often views the Central Government as an element focused on controlling the populace and extracting taxes from the tribes (Salzman 2011). The very nature of a centralized government is contrary to the concept of tribal autonomy and protection (Salzman2011). This distrust of the central government greatly inhibits the information flow between the populace and central government forces dedicated to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.

Police Distrust of Military:

Local law enforcement information is not readily and willingly shared among host nation forces. In many instances, police organizations, which are often comprised largely of local tribes, do not trust military counterparts, who are often from other regions and tribes. This is a significant problem because the local police units generally know the names of local terrorist facilitators and local terrorist leaders. Often, the best background information regarding a senior terrorist leader can be obtained through the local police units in the leader’s village or city of origin. However, due to the perception of corruption and possible information leaks, local law enforcement officials will not provide intelligence to central government agency officials.

This is in large part due to the fear of terrorist reprisal should it become known that a particular law enforcement official provided damning information about the network. This lack of communication greatly hinders the ability to identify and attack terrorist networks. When one considers that any foreign fighter leader must have a local base of support to operate in a particular area, the lack of local intelligence is a major obstacle. Every foreign fighter must be fed, clothed, housed, and moved by a local facilitator. Local law enforcement officials are best positioned to identify the facilitators. However, they are fearful of providing actionable intelligence to central government forces with the capabilities to arrest senior terrorist leaders due to fear of compromise.

Organizational Strength and Foot Soldiers are a Critical Component:

Gutfraind (2009) developed a mathematical model that helps determine which terrorist networks have a better chance of long-term survival, even in the midst of a focused counterterrorism effort. Understandably, there are many factors that play a role in the destruction or survival of a terrorist organization. However, Gutfraind’s (2009) model posits that a simultaneous decline in the overall strength of the organization and the number of foot soldiers will result in destruction of the terrorist organization with minimal capability to regenerate.

Gutfraind (2009) explains that in any counterterrorism effort, degrading the senior leadership is a critical component to destruction of the terrorist organization. However, the model mathematically demonstrates that without significantly diminishing the overall strength and number of foot soldiers, the pool of future leaders will be able to sustain and grow the organization (Gutfraind, 2009).Gutfraind’s (2009) research demonstrates mathematically that a key component to defeating the “New Terrorism” network lies with the

network's ability to recruit and train foot soldiers. To reduce the force strength of a terrorist organization the enemy's ability to recruit new foot soldiers through the use of social media, the internet, and recruiters, local forces with the knowledge and cultural understanding of the region must be utilized effectively.

Employ Units within Their Capability:

Whether it is a local law enforcement element or a national level counterterrorism unit, each element has strengths and weaknesses. For the local law enforcement agencies and paramilitary units, human intelligence and knowledge of local facilitators are their strengths. However, these units often lack the training and equipment to conduct raids against senior terrorist leaders. In addition, local law enforcement officials and their families live in the area and are extremely vulnerable to violent reprisals from terrorist organizations.

Conventional military forces and specialized counterterrorism units generally come from various areas around the country. This makes the unit members far less susceptible to reprisals from terrorist networks. This dynamic, combined with military equipment and a higher level of training and expertise makes them a formidable force. However, the local tribes generally do not trust a military force of centralized governments (Salzman, 2011). Another weakness of centralized units is the difficulty in identifying the local facilitation and recruiting networks. The priority effort for host nation counterterrorism units is to locate and engage senior terrorist leaders. Furthermore, elite host nation counterterrorism units cannot dedicate finite national level resources to conduct operations against local facilitators, recruiters, and basic foot soldiers as referred to in Gutfraind (2009).

Implementation of the Disrupt, Deny, Dismantle Model:

Just as this model is scalable across the threat spectrum, it is also scalable along the three doctrinal categories of Foreign Internal Defense: Indirect Support, FID Direct Support, and FID Combat Operations. Yarger (2015) describes Indirect Support as security assistance programs, which provide military exchange programs, training exercises and other methods designed to establish a strong military and economic foundation. Direct Support includes civil-military operations which improve host nation intelligence, information operations, communications, and mobility and logistics (Yarger, 2015). These missions do not include combat operations. FID Combat Operations include all of the Indirect Support operations with the additional presidential authorities to conduct combat operations in conjunction with host nation forces or until host nation forces are capable of self-sustaining combat operations (Yarger, 2015).

Through the use of the D³ model, Special Operations leaders can create an umbrella of interlocking capabilities across the globe and across the doctrinal categories of Foreign Internal Defense. This umbrella builds host nation capacity and capability and includes the requisite authorities for each category. By creating interlocking capabilities, the United States Military and its partners can track, control, and decimate terrorist organizations across international boundaries. Such a capability is a critical component to defeating New Terrorism. Each nation's enemy situation is different; therefore Special Operations Forces can and should incorporate different training programs. When and where applicable, Special Operations Forces should establish new host nation units, with varying roles and responsibilities, to effectively and efficiently counter and defeat the enemy tactics. In one country, a mobile strike force might be needed whereas in another country, a Gendarme force with the ability to police the rural areas may be a more effective fighting force.

Disrupt:

In countries where the cultural naming convention provides a link to each person's tribe and location, the inherent knowledge of local and provincial law enforcement officials is invaluable. The key element of any terrorist organization is the ability of its senior leaders to find safe havens to recruit more facilitators and foot soldiers, and then train those foot soldiers. This requires local level involvement. In recent months terrorist organizations such as Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have been able to conduct cross-border attacks into neighboring countries. This would not be possible if an effective facilitation network did not exist in those neighboring countries. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi cannot freely move around Iraq, even though he is an Iraqi. Due to tribal differences, Abu Dua must be facilitated by tribal members whenever he travels throughout areas ISIL does not control.

In many cases the local terrorist facilitators have a criminal background. Because many of the facilitators are known criminals, law enforcement officials usually know the identity of these individuals. In any of these scenarios, this does not infer that an entire tribe or village is an accomplice to these terrorist organizations. However, some members of these villages and or tribes are involved in the facilitation of these leaders and attackers. Just as Gearon (2013) describes in his research, many of these facilitators are most likely criminals. Following this logic, one can reasonably believe that the local facilitators and recruiters are well known to local law enforcement officials.

Police and Paramilitary Effort:

Due to a lack of coordination and distrust with central government entities, the intelligence flow and subsequent disruption efforts become intelligence silos at the various levels of the overarching counterterrorism strategy. No unit is in a better position to disrupt terrorist recruiting, propaganda, and facilitation efforts than local and provincial law enforcement elements. These units have an in depth knowledge of the criminal network that facilitates the terrorists. However, often times these organizations lack the understanding of how the local network fits into the transnational terrorist network.

Even when these units do understand the relationship, they often lack the resources to pursue the broader network. This is why the intelligence sharing and liaison effort is critical to creating a cohesive force. Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (2010), supports the need for the sharing of intelligence through the statement; "US joint intelligence network must be tied into the country team, the local host nation military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation" (p. VI-38).

Operationalize the Intelligence:

In order for the law enforcement units to capitalize on intelligence, they must have the proper training to plan and execute operations that disrupt terrorist activities. The primary law enforcement focus should be on local law enforcement units in major cities and provincial law enforcement units. While the Department of State is the lead agency for the training of host nation police units, Special Operations Advisors can provide advanced force protection training and act as advisors for operational planning and law enforcement intelligence gathering. Special Operations Forces should not be included in basic criminal justice training.

The key to pressuring the terrorist network is to disrupt their freedom to maneuver. Therefore, creating specialized law enforcement and paramilitary units may be necessary. Special Operations Forces should assist with the development of paramilitary units that can disrupt the facilitation networks and the media networks. Such units can conduct hasty checkpoints, along terrorist lines of communication, and quickly detain suspected terrorists in the market areas and other highly populated areas.

Unpredictable. These operations create an incredibly unpredictable force, which can be extremely effective against the morale of the terrorist network. These overt missions instill widespread fear of detention amongst the facilitation and propaganda networks. Often times, such units can have a larger impact on the enemy than a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit designed to conduct raids against local terrorist leaders. Additionally, the impact of the checkpoints increases the populace's confidence in local law enforcement because the populace perceives the law enforcement agencies are much larger than they truly are. This makes citizens feel safer and in some cases, more willing to provide information.

Disrupt Media and Propaganda Networks:

As Gutfraind (2009) determined, the need to eliminate the enemy's ability to recruit foot soldiers is imperative. Modern terrorist networks rely on the media and propaganda to recruit members. A seemingly small scale local terrorist attack or execution can immediately be sent around the world through social media and other forms of communication. These videos and other forms of propaganda can encourage others to join terrorist networks.

Some of the videos produced are very sophisticated. Most of these videos and other propaganda materials must be surreptitiously uploaded to the internet and other social media platforms. DVDs and other propaganda materials are distributed as in local markets. These media facilitators and couriers generally operate in very small groups, making them soft targets. Capturing these individuals is well within the capabilities of local law enforcement, if the appropriate intelligence is shared with the local units. Stopping the ability to distribute propaganda will have a profound effect on the ability to recruit foot soldiers.

Countering the Propaganda:

Local and provincial law enforcement can also assist in countering the propaganda of terrorist networks by producing videos which contain statements from locals who were victimized by terrorists. These videos can delegitimize the moral claims of a terrorist organization. The majority of the populace despises the terrorists and will often help as long as they can remain anonymous to local law enforcement officials and the terrorists. Much of the propaganda generated by terrorist networks seeks to legitimize terror attacks in various ways. In many countries, the local populace tends to be skeptical of information disseminated by foreign entities. Local and provincial law enforcement units are far more credible because they belong to the tribes within their areas. Working with indigenous law enforcement officials to disseminate information to counter the terrorist propaganda can be highly effective.

Decisive Action Equals Information Operations:

Simply by conducting a holistic disruption operation and maintaining pressure on the terrorists, decisive action can often provide the best form of positive messaging to the local populace. Another effective means of countering terrorist propaganda is through the daily discussions and interactions law enforcement officials have with the local populace. U.S. government agencies and military organizations can therefore capitalize on the populace's trust of local law enforcement. These officials can also provide great insight and recommendations for effective messaging. This messaging can be powerful, when conducted in conjunction with or just after a successful disruption operation.

Incorporate the Counter-narcotics Units:

Many terrorist organizations are involved in drug trafficking at various levels. According to Realuyo (2014) globalization has enabled terrorist groups and criminal networks to form loose alliances across the world.

These alliances are beneficial because they allow terrorist groups to finance operations with illicit funds obtained through criminal activity. Often times, drug trafficking is the prominent criminal activity. Hezbollah operates the most successful criminal organization, which includes activities such as drug and arms trafficking (Realuyo, 2014). Other terrorist groups involved in drug trafficking include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Taliban, and the Haqqani Network (Realuyo, 2014).

Counter-narcotics units have extensive knowledge of the smuggling networks and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by drug traffickers. Through loose alliances, terrorist organizations often use the same smuggling routes and the same facilitators (Realuyo, 2014). Paramilitary Counter-narcotics units possess the inherent knowledge of the drug traffickers and their direct and indirect affiliation with terrorist groups. Counter-narcotics units can assist in limiting the freedom of movement for terrorist groups smuggling fighters into an area. Partnering and liaising with counter-narcotics units will more readily identify traffickers who connect the criminal network and the terrorist networks. Capturing these connectors can provide a wealth of intelligence and establish pathways to senior terrorist leaders. The capture of terrorist facilitators with ties to drug trafficking can also be used to counter claims of legitimacy by terrorist groups. The criminal intelligence derived through counter-narcotics units can greatly enhance counterterrorism efforts.

Legalities:

Military Counterintelligence (CI) personnel have the authority to share intelligence, authorized for release, with host nation intelligence, security, and police elements operating within the CI member's area of operation (Foreign Internal Defense, 2010 p. VI-38). Acting as overt liaisons, CI personnel can bridge the information gap between local and provincial law enforcement units and the military units operating in the area. These liaisons can protect the law enforcement source of information and disseminate the information to the host nation military and counterterrorism units. Special Operations advisors, throughout the course of their mission, can also be the conduit for protecting then disseminating actionable intelligence to military and counterterrorism units. Authorities such as Title 22 and Title 10 can be used depending upon the level of Foreign Internal Defense support that is authorized (Yarger, 2015).

Deny

Cordon and Search Efficiency:

Military operations provide the foundation for area denial (Counterinsurgency, 2006). In many instances the military attempts to deny areas through cordon and search operations. However, such operations can cause dissension between the local populace and the central government. This can be tempered greatly by using the provincial law enforcement assets as the lead element with military units in a supporting role. Peic (2014) discusses how local forces have a much better understanding of the informal social networks, local personalities and customs. Terrorists use coercion to mobilize civilian support (Peic, 2014). Terrorist networks also creates economic hardship through instability. They then take advantage of economic distress to recruit unemployed and disenfranchised youth. Local law enforcement officials have the ability to discern terrorists and foreign fighters from the law abiding citizens coerced into supporting roles. This helps to limit the adverse effects of large scale cordon and search operations (Peic, 2014). These attributes enable local and regional law enforcement to gain and maintain the trust of the local populace.

Most cordon and search operations require a large number of troops. This generally requires a staging operation, which often alerts the terrorist of an impending operation. Once the military reaches the objective, the terrorists have already fled, making large scale cordon and searches far less effective. Cordon and Search operations take several days. This usually involves a large amount of military resources for minimal gain. During large scale cordon and search operations, the homes of the local populace are then searched. Albeit

some of the homes will belong to the local terrorists, the majority of the homes will be occupied by those who live under the tyranny of the local terrorist leadership.

Generally, these terrorist safe havens are located in villages outside the continual reach of military units. This greatly hinders the ability of the military to hold these areas or maintain a military presence. Within a few weeks of the cordon and search operation, the terrorist will return and the local populace will lose confidence in the military's ability to protect them. According to Peic (2014), the inability for the military to hold territory greatly diminishes the ability to gather local intelligence because the local populace knows the terrorists will return. Once they return the terrorists will exact revenge (Peic, 2014).

Hasty Checkpoints and Snap Traffic Control Points (TCPs):

A more effective and efficient method of denying terrorists access to safe havens is to deny access into and out of safe haven villages. This is best accomplished through hasty checkpoints and snap TCPs. Local intelligence units and local law enforcement often possess intelligence about safe haven villages and which terrorist leaders may be hiding in these safe havens. However, they lack the specific intelligence, as well as the required assets, necessary to capture the terrorist leader. Through the sharing of such broad scope intelligence, military units can conduct hasty checkpoints along the lines of communication that support the safe haven.

Hasty Checkpoints. Hasty checkpoints can be conducted with fewer assets than required for a cordon and search. Hasty checkpoints should be short duration operations for two reasons. The first is for force protection. By shortening the duration, the length of time the enemy has to plan and reconnoiter the checkpoint is greatly reduced. This thwarts enemy's ability to conduct an effective ambush. With the proper over watch and planning, a hasty ambush by the enemy will be effectively suppressed. Properly planned Hasty Checkpoints could also serve as a form of Movement to Contact designed to draw the enemy into a hostile engagement. The other aspect of short duration operations is mobility. A hasty checkpoint can be moved every day to a new location, causing disruption of the terrorist network and increasing the networks need to communicate.

An example of an effective hasty checkpoint operation would be one that lasts three days and is moved to three different lines of communication within this time frame. As part of an area denial campaign, hasty checkpoints would be conducted throughout safe haven areas on a rolling basis. This would allow the populace to see a government presence more often, which would increase confidence. During checkpoint stops with villagers, military forces could discuss Information Operations themes with the populace.

Successful military counter-ambush operations would have a devastating effect on facilitators and other terrorist elements in the area. Successful engagements of the enemy in the safe haven areas will become an information operation due to the fear instilled in the terrorist network. Very few countries have the number of soldiers necessary to maintain a presence in safe haven areas. Furthermore, terrorist networks will always seek out areas with minimal government control. The hasty checkpoint allows for smaller forces to be more effective.

Fly away checkpoints and small scale air assault missions. Terrorist elements create safe havens in ungoverned areas which are difficult for host nation forces to reach. Specialized Paramilitary units and military units should be trained to conduct basic air assault missions. These missions can carry the forces further into the safe haven areas for short duration missions. A night air assault mission into a hostile village requires extensive collective training, well beyond the capability of many nations. However, creating the ability to land forces near major lines of communication in remote areas and establish checkpoints during

daylight is not nearly as difficult. Thorough intelligence analysis can reduce the threat to security forces posed by daylight air assault operations.


These operations could yield extensive psychological and intelligence benefits because they would increase the confidence of the local populace, while surprising the terrorist couriers and facilitators. The intelligence gathered from the detention of couriers and facilitators would greatly enhance the F3AE process for CT forces. Basic air assault missions into less hostile areas would allow for a surprise presence patrol and show of force that would deter terrorists and encourage the local populace. While fly away checkpoints would be an extreme measure in a stable nation, this tactic would be extremely productive in a fragile nation.

Snap Traffic Control Points (Snap TCPs). These TCPs are similar to hasty checkpoints except they are designed for use in urban areas. Established TCPs in any area are quickly identified by insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. These elements develop alternate routes to avoid the standard checkpoints and continue to move freely throughout the city. Through the establishment of Snap TCPs, local law enforcement and specialized units can limit the freedom of maneuver of terrorists and criminals. Experience demonstrates that many criminals with warrants have been apprehended in this manner. These criminals, while not usually terrorists often have an understanding of the terrorist networks and how weapons and explosives are transported. Furthermore, the unpredictability of these checkpoints greatly degrades the terrorist facilitator's willingness to transit the area.

Dismantle:

Counterterrorism (CT) forces, in most countries, are focused on resolving terrorist situations and capturing or killing terrorist leaders. The methodologies used by counterterrorism forces would still continue to use the F3AE methodology that has proven effective. By capitalizing on the D³ model used by provincial law enforcement and military forces, CT forces could increase the speed of the F3AE cycle. Interdicting the enemy's decision loop faster will further cause disruption of the enemy command and control, which will increase strike opportunities.

While the F3AE targeting cycle should not change for CT forces, the targeting focus could be changed. New terrorism should not be viewed as a terrorist network but rather as a "Terrorist Machine", which contains critical components rather than just key personalities. For example, upstream components such as media cells and finance operations such as kidnapping and ransom cells should be targeted with specialized CT elements. While the key leaders of the media should be the primary target, attacking key media facilitators close to the media leader would damage a critical component, thereby disrupting the entire machine. The figure below depicts the key components and their leaders as individual sprockets that interconnect to ultimately drive the "Terrorist Machine".



Ability to Regenerate:

Attacking the key component leaders and their direct associates, as if sabotaging a critical component of a machine, would have a greater effect on the network. Gutfraind's (2009) work supports the theory that killing or capturing key leaders does not necessarily result in the long-term dismantlement of the terrorist organization. The regeneration of terrorist organizations in Iraq, which have now become the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan lend credibility to Gutfraind's (2009) research. Therefore, attacking the facilitation and operational components as a cell, would also allow the maximum use of resources. These facilitation cells generally operate in a smaller area, while the top terrorist leaders are spread across the region. Additionally, the intelligence flow would be faster and more accurate because of the aggregated information gleaned from multiple directly associated detainees.

Upstream Defeat of Media Cells:

One of the most critical components is the media cells. The media leaders are not generally combat experienced fighters. Because of their lack of combat skills they are easier to attack, engage, and interdict. They tend to be less experienced in physical security and have to travel frequently to retrieve, disseminate, and upload videos and other messages to internet and social media sites. Due to their volume of interaction, these individuals could be a valuable source of intelligence. According to Mozes and Weiman (2010) terrorists use the internet in eight different ways to support their effort. The key uses are: psychological warfare, recruitment, networking and fundraising (Mozes&Weiman, 2010). Because the terrorists are able to quickly establish and change websites, attacking the media cell members is far more effective than trying to interdict web sites and or promote information operations that dissuade potential terrorists. A small CT element designated with the mission to focus on the media component could greatly impede the terrorist recruiting and messaging effort.

Better intelligence coordination, using liaison elements embedded with provincial law enforcement agencies and host nation tactical and operational level commanders would provide context and opportunity to the CT forces. The liaison intelligence elements should be members of the CT force. Such personnel have the most insight as to the capabilities of the CT force. Because much of the targeting tactics, techniques, and procedure must remain classified, only intelligence and operational members of the CT forces could effectively focus the efforts of host nation units.

The liaisons could advise the host nation forces as to where and how to disrupt or deny enemy activity without having to share vital classified information. Champion football teams use their defense to constantly pressure their opponent's offense, which forces mistakes such as fumbles and interceptions. Used properly, the CT liaison elements would act as the mechanism that continually and holistically pressures the enemy in order to force mistakes in the enemy's operational security (OPSEC) and decision cycle. These mistakes provide opportunities for national level CT forces to use their classified resources and capitalize on the enemy's mistakes.


Another method of maximizing assets would be to attack the key facilitation leadership in addition to the key terrorist leaders. Just as a conventional war requires the engagement of supply lines and communications nodes, so too must the key facilitation components of the Terrorist Machine be engaged. While CT forces cannot dedicate resources to every aspect of the facilitation components, the key facilitation leaders and their immediate subordinates must be engaged. By creating a network of host nation provincial forces focused on disruption and denial, much of the facilitation apparatus can be attacked by this provincial level host nation forces. The advisory role of the CT liaisons is a critical aspect of such disruption and denial operations.

Conclusion:

CT forces must lead the overarching campaign. However, host nation elements must be used to the fullest. Host nation forces must be used within their cultural and professional capabilities. Not every law enforcement and military organization is capable of acting as a strike force. Furthermore, pinpoint strikes at every echelon do not create the holistic pressure necessary to have a psychological impact on the broader terrorist entity. Therefore, an approach that allows elements to disrupt, deny, and dismantle the terrorist machine, within the element's tactical and operational capability, will greatly increase success.

New terrorism and its transnational capability must be viewed as a "Terrorist Machine" with numerous critical components instead of being viewed as a vast network of key personalities. Critical components such as logistics and communications must be defeated as a whole; in much the same way as a sprocket must be damaged to stop the movement of a machine. The removal of one leader, just as the destruction of one tooth on a sprocket, will not stop the machine. In most cases, it will only hinder the momentum in the short term. A greater focus must also be placed on the upstream components critical to the sustainment of a terrorist organization (Gutfraind, 2009).

When properly implemented, the D³ model should appear much like an atom which has various components constantly in motion. This approach will also allow host nation forces to fight the terrorists more holistically, while reducing the amount of western advisors required.



Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are expensive to operate and finite. Defeating new terrorism will require a holistic approach with a much larger focus on the inclusion of law enforcement assets. The sense of inclusion by local officials and the local populace will serve as an incentive to resist the terrorist movement. Based on Salzman's (2011) research, the inclusion of the tribes through the use of provincial law enforcement elements is crucial to the successful defeat of new terrorism. This effort will require advanced force protection training to compliment current law enforcement training, while maintaining and promoting the rule of law. Intelligence liaison elements must be closely tied to the provincial law enforcement elements in order to push and pull information. This can increase efficiency and reduce the cost of the targeting cycle whenever and wherever possible.

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